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REVIEW
IMPEACHMENT
Arthur Bestor*
IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS. By
Raoul Berger. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973.
Pp. xiv, 345. $14.95.
For the first time since the administration of Andrew Johnson, the
impeachment of a President of the United States has emerged into the
realm of the thinkable and the possible. One indication of this is the
fact that public sentiment on the matter is now routinely assessed in
opinion polls.1 Raoul Berger's treatise, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems, is therefore exceedingly timely. It would be a gross
mistake, however, to think of the book as a mere tract for the times. It
is a comprehensive and scholarly analysis, both historical and legal, of
the crucial issues posed by this rarest but most momentous of all prosecution and trial procedures.
The range and depth of Professor Berger's learning is most impressive. Though concerned with 20th century problems of impeachment
in the United States, he chooses as a starting point the English Statute
or Declaration of Treasons of 1352, promulgated almost a century
and a half before the discovery of America. Six hundred years of
Anglo-American constitutional history are thus brought to bear upon
a complex of interrelated problems. The author amasses evidence
and offers penetrating comment on such diverse and perplexing ques* Professor of History, University of Washington. Ph.B., Yale University, 1930,
Ph.D., 1938; M.A., Oxford University, 1956; LL.D., Lincoln University, 1959. In
1956-57 Mr. Bestor was Harmsworth Professor of American History at Oxford and in
1967 Fulbright Visiting Professor of American History at Tokyo University. Before
coming to the University of Washington he served on the faculties of Yale, Columbia,
Stanfoid, Wisconsin and (for fifteen years) the University of Illinois. Mr. Bestor's arti-

cles in the field of constitutional history include: The American Civil War as a Constitutional Crisis, 69 AM. HISTORICAL REV. 327 (1964); State Sovereignty and Slavery: A
Reinterpretation of Proslavery Constitutional Doctrine, 1846-1860, 54 J. ILL. ST.

117 (196 1). He is also the author of books on other aspects of American
history and on educational problems.
1. See, e.g., TIME, Sept. 10, 1973, at 18-19.
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tions as the meaning of "high crimes and misdemeanors," the inherently political nature of impeachments, the relationship of indictment
to impeachment with its resultant possibility of double jeopardy, the
reviewability of convictions voted by an upper legislative chamber sitting as a court for the trial of impeachments and the test of "good
behavior" as applied to the tenure of judges.2
REMOVAL OF CORRUPT JUDGES

I.

It is actually the last of these problems, the impeachment of judges,
that is the focus of Berger's concern. As he reminds the reader, "the
lion's share of the debate about impeachment in the last forty years"
has revolved about the trial and removal not of high executive officers
but of corrupt, incompetent or partisan judges. 3 To Berger it is distressing that impeachment, "[o] nce employed to topple giants," has4
sunk "to the ouster of dreary little judges for squalid misconduct."
This unfortunate development has not only diverted attention from
2. For the record it should be pointed out that impeachment is dealt with in five separate and scattered sections of the Constitution. Two are in article I, which deals with
legislative powers. Section 2 provides that "The House of Representatives . . . shall
have the sole Power of Impeachment" (clause 5). Section 3 contains the longest statement of all:
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all I mpeachments. When sitting for that
Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United
States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted
without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present. Judgment in Cases
of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United
States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law (clauses 6 and 7).
There are references in two sections of article II, which deals with the executive. Section
2 gives the President "Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the
United States, except in Cases of Impeachment" (clause 1). Section 4 reads in full as follows: "The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be
removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." The last of the references is in article III, which
deals with the judiciary. The third clause of section 2 provides that "The Trial of all
Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury." Though this article provides
that judges "shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour," no specific mention of impeachment is made in this connection. The last of these provisions (art. 3, § 2, cl. 3)
is omitted, strangely enough, in the list of "Provisions of the United States Constitution Regarding the Matter of Impeachment" on the first page of the new compilation
published by the House Judiciary Committee. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,

93d CONG.,

]ST. SaSS., IMPEACHMENT: SELECTED MATERIALS (Comm. Print,

Oct. 1973).
3.

R.

BERGER,

IMPEACHMENT:

[hereinafter cited as BERGER].

4.
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the main function of impeachment, but has also stood in the way of
enforcing proper standards of judicial integrity. Impeachment, as
Berger points out, is too cumbersome and time-consuming a process
to be invoked for punishing run-of-the-mill delinquencies by relatively
minor officials. As a consequence, unfit judges continue to preside
unchallenged over inferior courts. This situation leads the author to
devote the longest and most closely reasoned of his chapters (IV) to
the question whether impeachment is the only constitutionally permissible method of removing federal judges. His answer is an emphatic
negative.
Berger argues in brief that tenure during "good behavior" was designed to prevent interference by the politicalbranches of government
with the independence of the judiciary, not to give immunity to a corrupt judge against trial and conviction in regular judicial proceedings.
Though removal of a judge at the behest of one of the political
branches requires (as it should) a showing of "high crimes and misdemeanors" before a court of impeachment, a misdeed of lesser scale
may well represent such a lapse of "good behavior" as to justify removal, provided the determination is a purely judicial one, insulated
from political pressures. Berger is convinced-and this reviewer is
convinced by him-that neither English precedents, nor American
constitutional provisions, nor doctrines about the separation of powers
stand in the way of providing for the removal of an unfit judge after
conviction in a regular criminal trial. What is required, and what
Berger believes should be adopted, is a statute defining the forms of
judicial behavior that are (to borrow George Orwell's word) "ungood," and empowering the courts to pronounce judgments of forfei5
tures of office.
II.

IMPEACHMENT OF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

Compared to the forthrightness with which Professor Berger sets
forth his findings and formulates his recommendations on the removal
of judges, there is a certain inconclusiveness about his treatment of
other-and in many respects more central-matters.
As the author himself points out, "[t] he Founders conceived im-

5.

Id. at 179-80.
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peachment chiefly as a 'bridle' upon the President and his coadjutors." 6 But though four of Berger's ten chapters (IV-VI and VIII)
deal almost exclusively with the impeachment of judges, and though
another entire chapter (VII) is devoted to the peripheral question
whether legislators are subject to impeachment, there is no separate
chapter analyzing impeachment as applied to the members of the
executive branch, and only one (IX, describing the trial of Andrew
Johnson) in which a President is the central figure. To be sure, much
of what is said about impeachment in general is applicable, but a
proceeding for removal of the actual head of state raises so many
delicate yet formidable issues that one is entitled to ask for a unified
treatment of the special problems involved in presidential impeachments.
A.

The Definition of Treason

The gravest charge that can be made in an impeachment proceeding is obviously the charge of treason. Berger, therefore, commences his book with a chapter on that topic, wherein, with a lively
respect for historical perspective, he goes back to the English Statute
of Treasons of 1352. The discussion tends, however, to get sidetracked
on a comparatively minor issue. The Statute of Treasons undertook to
declare "what Offences shall be adjudged Treason," and one of its
definitions is still a living part of American law. "Treason against the
United States," says the Constitution, "shall consist only in levying
War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid
and Comfort."'7 The phrasing was consciously borrowed from the
English statute, which provided that "if a Man do levy War against
our Lord the King in his Realm, or be adherent to the King's Enemies
in his Realm, giving to them Aid and Comfort in the Realm, or elsewhere," he is to be judged guilty of treason.8 But the Statute of Treasons said many other things as well, and these have engendered controversy ever since. The particular provision that Berger seizes upon is
a saving clause or salvo, which reads as follows: 9
6. Id. at 122; see also id. at 91, 98-101, 146.
7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl.1.
8. Declaration of what Offences shall be adjudged Treason, 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5,c. 2, §
4 (1352). See 1 Statutes of the Realm 319, 320 (Great Britain); 2 Statutes at Large
50, 51 [D. Pickering ed. 1762] (Great Britain).
9. Id.; quoted in BERGER in full, at 8. One must remember that if a man were con-
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And because that many other like Cases of Treason may happen in
Time to come, which a Man cannot think nor declare at this present
Time; It is accorded, That if any other Case, supposed Treason, which
is not above specified, doth happen before any Justices, the Justices
shall tarry without any going to Judgement of the Treason, till the
Cause be shewed and declared before the King and his Parliament,
whether it ought to be judged Treason or other Felony.
This salvo could be read in two opposite ways, either as a restraint
imposed upon the justices in order to prevent an oppressive enlargement of the domain of treason, or as a reservation by King and Parliament of the power to punish as a traitor a person whose offense had
not amounted to treason at the time he committed it. The latter possibility furnishes the title for Berger's opening chapter, "The Parliamentary Power to Declare Retrospective Treasons." With scholarly thoroughness the author analyzes the controversies that occurred over the
point, and discusses the impact on the great English impeachment
trials of the 17th century. But so intense a concentration upon this
single issue tends, unfortunately, to foster the impression that the ambiguous salvo of 1352 was the hinge on which turned the whole
mighty question whether treason would be narrowly defined and liberty of political opinion thereby safeguarded, or whether treason
would become a dragnet to sweep up critics and dissenters indiscriminately.
The issue itself is of immense significance in the history of
Anglo-American freedom, but the salvo of 1352 was by no means the
crux of the matter. In point of fact, treason was never narrowly defined in English law in the centuries prior to the American Revolution.
And the various means by which its sweep could be even further extended were unaffected by any reading that could possibly be given to
the salvo. The statute of 1352 was itself a free-wheeling affair, which
branded as treason a wide range of offenses far removed from levying
war against the King and giving aid and comfort to his enemies. By
the terms of the statute it was treason for a man to lie with the Queen,
victed of treason his estate was forfeited to the king; if of felony, to the lord from whom
he held his lands. T. PLuCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 479-80 (3d
ed. 1940). There were thus economic motives for withholding from the justices the ultimate power to decide in doubtful cases whether a particular offense constituted treason
or felony. "The primary object of the statute was probably legal, rather than political,"
one purpose being "to settle the rules about forfeitures." McKisack, The Fourteenth
Century, 1307-1399, in 5 OXFORD HISTORY OF ENGLAND 257 (1959).
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or with the wife of the Heir Apparent, or with the King's eldest
daughter (if unmarried). It was treason to counterfeit the royal seals
or the coin of the realm. It was treason to slay the Chancellor or
Treasurer or any of the Justices "being in their Places, doing their
Offices." Above all, it was treason "to compass or imagine the Death
of our Lord the King, or of our Lady the Queen, or of their eldest Son
and Heir."' 0 So long as it was possible to punish a man for thinking
treason, there was no real limit to possible prosecutions for "constructive treason."
New statutes, moreover, could create new treasons, and with the
rise and fall of ruling houses this happened recurrently. As a sample
one may abbreviate a single item in Maitland's long catalogue of such
statutory alterations: 1'
[N] ine Acts of Henry VIII create new treasons-four directed
against the supporters of the pope, five devoted towards maintaining
the royal succession as it stood after the king's various marriages:thus it was made treason to . . . pronounce by express . . . words
that the king is an heretic, schismatic, tyrant, infidel or usurper; . . .to imagine to deprive the king of his title as supreme head of
the church; [or] to assert the validity of the king's marriage with
Anne of Cleves.
In the following century, after Charles I was beheaded, Parliament
made it treason to publish or openly declare that the Commonwealth
government, without King or House of Lords, was "tyrannical,
usurped, or unlawful." 12 After his son was restored as Charles II it
became treason to "compass, imagine, invent, devise, or intend . . .
to deprive or depose him from the stile, honour, or kingly name of the
imperial crown of this realm."' 13
Even without adopting new statutory definitions of treason or extending old ones by construction, Parliament could always make an
end run by passing a bill of attainder (as it did in the case of the Earl
10.

11.
12.

See note 8 supra.

F. MAITLAND,

THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND

Act of July 17, 1649.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL

227 (1908).

DOCUMENTS

OF THE

PURITAN

1625-1660, at 388-89 (3d ed. S. Gardiner ed. 1906).
Treasons Act, 13 Car. 2, stat. 1, c. 1, §§ 4,5 (1661). See 5 Statutes of the Realm

REVOLUTION

13.

304 (Great Britain), reprinted in

SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

538,

539 (C. Stephenson & F. Marcham eds. 1937). It is instructive to examine the succession of treason statutes excerpted in this work: 1352 (at 227), 1495 (at 301). 1571
(at 351), 1649 (at 522), 1661 (at 538), 1696 (at 609), 1795 (at 668).
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of Strafford in 1641), thus decreeing punishment without the formalities of either a common-law trial or an impeachment.
Given all these means of casting the dragnet of treason wider, the
question whether the salvo of 1352 permitted or forbade Parliament
"to declare retrospective treasons" pales into relative insignificance.
What the framers of the American Constitution were taught by the
English experience with impeachments for high treason was the necessity of tearing up by the roots the whole crop of thorny and poisonous weeds that had flourished in connection with treason trials.
They got rid of the salvo of 1352 (if it was in their minds at all) by
prohibiting ex post facto laws. 14 But they tackled the graver abuses
just as drastically. Bills of attainder were prohibited to both the federal government and the states, 15 thus disposing of such precedents as
the attainder of Strafford. So far as treason was concerned, the Constitution went back to the statute of 1352, but for the sole purpose of
selecting its most restrictive definition of treason and making this the
only ground for treason prosecutions in the United States.' 6 Finally,
impeachment was shorn of its sanguinary attributes, for the infliction
of ordinary criminal punishments (executions, imprisonments and
fines) was left to ordinary courts of law, and the penalties that a court
of impeachment might impose were limited to removal from office
7
and perpetual disqualification.'
B.

"High" Crimes and Misdemeanors

Since history had taught the framers of the Constitution the potential abuses of impeachment, why, then, was the process retained at
all? This is certainly a question that must be answered if we are to
understand what Berger calls "the grand design of the Framers."' 8
Removal from and disqualification for office could easily be attached
14. -U.S. CoNsT.art. I, § 9, cI. 2 (restriction on federal government); § 10, cl. I (restriction on states).
15.

See note 14 supra.

16. "Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against
them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort." U.S. CoNsT. art.
III, § 3, cl.1 (emphasis added).
17. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.

18.

BERGER, at 3. He does ask this question, at 97, but in a tendentious way:

"Why . . . did the Framers take up this faction-ridden mechanism which . . . had

seen its best days?" His answer that it was a "safety valve" (at 98) can hardly be considered definitive.
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as an added penalty to whatever else the regular courts might be empowered by law to inflict upon persons convicted of treason or
bribery. Obviously, then, there was something about "high crimes and
misdemeanors"-the catch-all phrase in the impeachment clausewhich the framers felt could only be dealt with by the two houses of
Congress, one acting as "the most solemn grand inquest of the whole"
nation (Blackstone's phrase), 19 the other sitting as a high court for the
trial of impeachments, and thus exercising, for this occasion only, the
judicial powers of the House of Lords, which Blackstone had described (in this very context of impeachments) as "the most high and
supreme court of criminal jurisdiction. ' 20
The meaning to be given to the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" is therefore the central question to be examined in any discussion of the constitutional law of impeachments. Berger's second
chapter undertakes such an examination. At the outset he rejects the
unthinking view that the word "high" is merely a piece of rhetorical
embroidery, and insists, correctly, that it is a technical term. "High
crimes and misdemeanors," he writes, are not "simply ordinary crimes
and misdemeanors raised to the nth degree."12 English precedents
make clear that they were considered to be offenses of a special kind,
known only in the law of impeachments, "without roots in the ordinary criminal law" and bearing "no relation to whether an indictment
would lie in the particular circumstances. '22
What is it that gives to this species of misconduct its special character? In other words, what makes a high crime or misdemeanor
"high?" Berger, it seems to this reviewer, glimpses the answer at the
beginning but then shies away from it. "High crimes and misdemeanors," he asserts, "were a category of political crimes against the
state." 23 In support he furnishes from almost every period a wealth of
quotations wherein terms equivalent to "political" and "against the
state" are employed to mark out the distinguishing characteristics of
an impeachable crime. The most telling American statement is probably that of James Wilson, who had written on British constitutional
19. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
[hereinafter cited as W. BLACKSTONE].
20. Id.
21.

BERGER, at 59.

22.
23.

Id. at 62.
Id. at 61 (emphasis in original).
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law as applied to the colonies as early as 1774,24 who was one of the
two or three principal architects of the Constitution in 1787,25 who
was in the first group of appointees to the Supreme Court in 1789, and
who immediately after his appointment attempted, in a series of lectures as Professor of Law at the College of Philadelphia, to set forth
the foundations of the new American constitutional system. In these
Lectures on Law, delivered in 1790-91 but published posthumously in
1804, he wrote: "In the United States . . . impeachments are confined to political characters, to political crimes and misdemeanors, and
'26
to political punishments.
The later and even more famous Commentaries of Joseph Story,
another justice of the Supreme Court who was also a professor of law,
likewise recognized the inescapably political nature of impeach27
ment:
The jurisdiction is to be exercised over offences, which are committed
by public men in violation of their public trust and duties. Those duties are, in many cases, political. . . .Strictly speaking, then, the
power partakes of a political character, as it respects injuries to the
society in its political character.
Moreover, the penalties of removal and disqualification resulted, said
Story, in "limiting the punishment to such modes of redress, as are
peculiarly fit for a political tribunal to administer, and as will secure
the public against political injuries. '2 8 And he defined the latter as
"[s] uch kind of misdeeds . . . as peculiarly injure the common'2 9
wealth by the abuse of high offices of trust.
This element of injury to the commonwealth-that is, to the state
itself and to its constitution-was historically the criterion for distin-

24. J. WILSON, Considerationson the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority
of the British Parliament,in 2 JAMES WILSON, WORKS 721 (G. McCloskey ed. 1967).

25.

"Washington considered him to be one of the strongest men in the convention."
21 (1913). "With the possible exception of James Madison," writes Julian P. Boyd, ". . . no member of the convention of
1787 was better versed in the study of political economy . . .and none was more
far-sighted in his vision of the future greatness of the United States." J. Boyd, James
Wilson, in 20 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 326, 329 (1928-37).
26. 1 JAMES WILSON, WORKS, supra note 24, at 426; quoted in BERGER, at 76.
27. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION

744, at 217 (1st ed. 1833) [hereinafter cited as J. STORY]. See also id.

§ 801,

at 212;

quoted (from a later edition with different section numbering) by BERGER, at 79.
28. 2 J. STORY, supra note 27, § 810, at 278.
29. Id. § 788, at 256.
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guishing a "high" crime or misdemeanor from an ordinary one. The
distinction goes back to the ancient law of treason, which differentiated "high" from "petit" treason. The distinction was stated per30
spicuously by Blackstone:
. . . in it's very name (which is borrowed from the French)
imports a betraying, treachery, or breach of faith. . . . [T] reason
is . . . a general appellation, made use of by the law, to denote ...

TREASON

that accumulation of guilt which arises whenever a superior reposes a
confidence in a subject or inferior, . . . and the inferior . . . so

forgets the obligations of duty, subjection, and allegiance, as to destroy
the life of any such superior or lord. .

.

. [T] herefore for a wife to

kill her lord or husband, a servant his lord or master, and an ecclesiatic
his lord or ordinary; these, being breaches of the lower allegiance, of
private and domestic faith, are denominated petit treasons. But when
disloyalty so rears it's crest, as to attack even majesty itself, it is called
by way of eminent distinction high treason, alta proditio; being equivalent to the crimen laesae majestatis of the Romans.

As a technical term, therefore, a "high" crime signified a crime against
the sovereign.
Though high treason included acts injurious to the sovereign personally, the gravamen of the charge was injury to the state and subversion of its constitution or fundamental law. Such was clearly the
understanding of the House of Commons when it voted, on the 24th
November 1640, to impeach Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford,
of high treason. Strafford was accused not of acts directed against the
King personally, but of carrying out too faithfully the latter's unconstitutional purposes. The first of the articles of impeachment charged: 3 1
That he the said Thomas, Earl of Strafford, hath traiterously endeavoured to subvert the Fundamental Laws and Government of the Realms
of England and Ireland, and in stead thereof, to introduce an Arbitrary

30. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 75 (emphasis in original).
3 1. J. RUSHWORTH, The Tryal of Thomas Earl of Strafford . . . upon an Inpeachmient of High Treason in 8 HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS 8 (1721) [hereinafter
cited as HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS]. The House of Commons voted on Nov. 1I, 1640,
to send a message to the House of Lords accusing Strafford of high treason: on
Nov. 24 it adopted a set of nine articles, of which the first is quoted above; and on
Jan. 30, 1641, it voted 28 additional articles (id. at 61-75). The charge of "subverting
the fundamental Laws of the Kingdom" occurred in impeachments from as early
as 1450, several examples being cited in the arguments at Strafford's trial (e.g., id.
at 673).
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and Tyrannical Government against Law, which he hath declared by
traiterous words, Counsels, and Actions, and by giving His Majesty
Advice, by force of Arms, to compel his Loyal Subjects to submit
thereunto.
After two weeks and a half of the trial (which began in the House of
Lords on the 22nd March 1641), the Commons decided to cut short
the proceedings by employing a bill of attainder. Strafford was beheaded on Tower HIll on the 12th of May 1641, two days after King
Charles I sacrificed him to his enemies by giving royal assent to this
attainder. The preamble to the bill that brought Strafford to the block
recited the original first article of impeachment and elaborated it by
holding Strafford guilty also of "exercising a Tyrannous and Exorbitant Power over, and against the Laws of the said Kingdoms, and
the Liberties, Estates, and Lives of His Majesty's Subjects," and of
having presumed to "Counsel and Advise His Majesty, That he was
32
loose and absolvedfrom the Rules of Government."
A difference of degree, not a difference of kind, separated "high"
treason from other "high" crimes and misdemeanors. In many English
impeachments the defendant was charged with both.3 3 The common
element in all these accusations was obviously the injury done to the
state and its constitution, whereas among the particular offenses producing such injury some might rank as treasons, some as felonies and
some as misdemeanors, among which might be included various
offenses that in other contexts would fall short of actual criminality.
The idea of such a gradation is implicit in Blackstone's classification
32.

Id. at 756. The bill of attainder was introduced on April 10, 1641, the day

after the Commons decided that continuance of the trial would be "prejudicial . . .
to the Kingdom," considering "the great Necessities of the Kingdom, the Pressures
of the Time, and how much time has been spent in this Trial." Id. at 44-45. The bill
passed the Commons on April 21 and the Lords on May 7, and it received the royal
assent on May 10. In 1662, after the Restoration, An Act for Reversing the Earle of
Strafford his Attainder provided that all records "bee wholly cancelled and taken
of the Fyle, or otherwayes defaced and obliterated, to the intent the same may not
bee visible in after ages." 14 Car. 2, c. 29, § 2 (1662), 5 Statutes of the Realm 424
(Great Britain), 8 HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS, supra.note 31, at 778. In fact, however,

the Act of Attainder, 16 Car. I, c. 38 (1641) is published officially in 5 Statutes of the
Realm 177 (Great Britain).
33. According to BERGER (at 59) the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" was
first used in certain impeachment trials of 1386, where, however, most of the convictions
were for treason, which was also charged. See A. SIMPSON, A TREATISE ON FEDERAL
IMPEACHMENTS 86-87 (1916) and the entire appendix therein, at 81-190, which analyzes the long series of English impeachment trials and to which Berger gives frequent
citations.
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of "high misdemeanors" among "such high offences as are under the
degree of capital, but nearly bordering thereon," and his characteri34
zation of them as "Contempts, affecting the King and Government."
Berger seems ready at first to acquiesce in this definition of "high
crimes and misdemeanors," for he writes that "[t] reason is plainly a
political crime," that bribery is of the same nature because its aim is
"to corrupt administration of the State," and that therefore the
''association . . . of 'other high crimes and misdemeanors' with
'treason, bribery,' which are unmistakably 'political' crimes, lends
them a similar connotation." 35 After stating this, however, Berger
rather abruptly changes the direction of his argument. His preoccupation with the removal of corrupt judges comes to the fore, and he
draws back in alarm from the idea of vesting in "a political tribunal"
(as Story frankly described it36) any power over the judiciary. What
rings sour in Berger's ears is a statement made by Congressman
Gerald R. Ford in April, 1970, when proposing as a measure of par
tisan retaliation the impeachment of Justice William 0. Douglas. O
that occasion Ford argued that "an impeachable offense is whatever a
majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be" and asserted that "there are few fixed principles" to govern the matter. This
claim to unlimited and unprincipled power is quoted in the first sentence of Berger's chapter on high crimes and misdemeanors, and three
37
further allusions to Ford's views are made before the chapter ends.
This coldly cynical threat to the independence of the judiciary seems
to block off for Berger any further consideration of the possibility that
the framers did in fact contemplate-and may have been justified in
contemplating-"proceedings of a political nature" if (in James Wilson's words) "confined to political characters," directed against "political crimes and misdemeanors" and eventuating solely in "political
punishments."38
C.

Impeachment as a Significant Check on the Usurpationsof Executive Officials
Half way through the chapter on "High Crimes and Misdemean-

34.

4 W. BLACKSTONE, stupra note 19, at 119.

35.

BERGER, at 62.

36.
37.

See note 28 supra.
BERGER, at 53, 86, 94, 96; see also BERGER, at 103, 123, 155 n.150, 159, 298.

38.

1 JAMES WILSON, WORKS, supra note 24, at 426 (emphasis added).
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ors," Berger appears to this reviewer to abandon any real effort to
explain the role of impeachment as a check on the usurpations of executive officials and seems anxious instead to explain away into virtual nothingness the whole procedure. His motivation is a profound
and laudable respect for judicial due process and an equally profound
distrust of political trials. But this reasoning, though learned and ingenious, strikes this reviewer as unhistorical and extra-constitutional.
Four of Berger's particular arguments tending to play down the
role of impeachment call for comment. The first two can be disposed
of briefly. An entire section of chapter II carries the heading "Is Impeachment a Criminal Proceeding?"3 9 Despite the fact that the word
"crimes" stares one in the face in the chapter title itself, "High Crimes
and Misdemeanors," and in the impeachment clause from which the
phrase comes, Berger nevertheless argues for treating impeachment
not as a form of criminal trial but as a non-penal "removal procedure. '40 To be sure, certain criminal penalties cannot be inflicted in
impeachments, but those that can-removal and disqualificationare certainly punishments, as the Supreme Court has held in various
of its decisions on bills of attainder. 41 Berger's arguments to the contrary, though ingenious, are strained and unconvincing. An example is
his contention 42 that unless impeachment is (in modern jargon) "decriminalized," then the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy must negate the constitutional provision that an official convicted in impeachment proceedings "shall nevertheless be liable and
subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to
43
Law."
The fifth amendment, however, reads as follows: "nor shah any
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb" (emphasis added). The original Constitution limited the
penalties in impeachment trials so that they did not and could not extend to life or limb. The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment thus explicitly excepted impeachments. The mere fact that 80
years later, in 1873, the Supreme Court extended the protection of the
39.

BERGER, at 78-85.

40.

Id. at 82.

41.

Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S.

(4 Wall.) 333 (1867); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
42. BERGER, at 80-81, 297; reiterated in a letter from Berger to TIME, Sept. 10,
1973, at4.
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.
7.
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double jeopardy clause to cases not involving life and limb, 44 can
hardly be construed as a judicial holding to the effect either that the
impeachment clause was repealed by the fifth amendment, or that
impeachment is a non-criminal proceeding.
Likewise unconvincing is Berger's argument 45 that the sixth amendment, which reiterated the guarantee of jury trial that had already
been given in the body of the Constitution, somehow constituted a silent repeal of the exception contained in that original clause, which
reads: "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury. ' 46 Nothing in the debates on the Bill of Rights indicates an intention to eliminate this exception.
A second argument, elaborated in Berger's third chapter, would
make a conviction by the Senate susceptible to judicial review. In historical terms it is safe to say that nothing in the English precedents
and nothing in the discussions during the making of the American
Constitution contradict the universally accepted view that the Senate
in impeachments was intended as a court of last resort. That there
might be merit in extending judicial review in the manner suggested is
another question, and Berger is eloquent in urging "that judicial review of impeachments is required to protect the other branches from
Congress' arbitrary will."' 47 Once again one feels that Berger is
thinking primarily of Congressman Ford's attempted assault on judicial independence. In the light of the distribution of actual power
today between the executive branch and the legislative, it is hard to
share his fear that without judicial review of impeachments, "Congress would be free to shake the other branches to their very foundations."

48

Better grounded historically, but nevertheless unconvincing to this
reviewer, is Berger's third contention. According to him, the framers
of the American Constitution intended to convert "high crimes and
misdemeanors" from an obviously flexible category, which comprised
illegal acts of almost every conceivable sort provided they threatened
to subvert the state or the Constitution, into a rigidly limited class of
44.
n.138.
45.
46.
47.
48.
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Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 172-73 (1873); cited in BERGER. at 81
BERGER, at 81-84, 297.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.3 (emphasis added).
BERGER, at 119.
Id.
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specific acts, for which exact precedents would have to be found in
English impeachments. 49 The framers did, of course, adopt an extremely rigid definition of treason, but they did so deliberately and
explicitly. Berger's contention that a similar rigidity was imposed by
the framers on the hitherto flexible phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" rests upon an extremely strained interpretation of rather
tenuous evidence-specifically on two minor episodes in the Constitutional Convention of 1787.
On August 28, 1787, the extradition clause of the Constitution
came up for discussion. As then phrased, it called for the rendition of
fugitives "charged with treason, felony, or high misdemeanor." It
seems clear that the word "high" was intended as a synonym for grave
or serious or gross. But various members recognized that "high misdemeanor" was the term commonly used to signify an impeachable offense, and they expressed doubt "whether 'high misdemeanor' had not
a technical meaning too limited." The point was, of course, that only
persons charged with impeachable offenses would be within the terms
of the clause. The Convention responded by substituting "other
crimes. '5 0 Eleven days later, on the 8th of September, a clause relating to impeachment came up for discussion, with only two grounds
specified, namely "treason or bribery."'5 1 Noting that treason had already been narrowly defined and bills of attainder outlawed, George
Mason pointed out that "[a] ttempts to subvert the Constitution may
not be treason as above defined." Presumably recalling Blackstone's
statement that the "first and principal" kind of misdemeanor was "the
mal-administrationof such high officers, as are in public trust and
employment," 52 Mason moved to add "maladministration" to "treason" and "bribery" as grounds for impeachment. Madison, unaware
or forgetful of Blackstone's definition, objected that "maladministration" was "[s] o vague a term" that it would be equivalent to providing "tenure during the pleasure of the Senate." At this point, Mason
proposed the equally Blackstonian and even more traditional phrase
"other high crimes and misdemeanors," and the Convention adopted
49.

Id. at 7I, 74, 86-88, 106, 298.

50.

2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787,

at 443

(1911-37), discussed in BERGER, at 74, 86 [hereinafter cited as M. FARRAND].

51. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 50, at 550. This phrasing had been adopted Sept. 4,
1787. Id. at 495.
52. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 121 (emphasis in the original).
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the suggestion, 53 thus enlarging the grounds for impeachment that had
54
been specified in the original draft.
On the basis of these two episodes, Berger argues that the constitutional phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" must be read not only
as a technical term (which it is) but also as a term with almost as specific a meaning as "robbery" or "bribery." 55 The way to determine
that meaning, he insists, is to analyze the specific acts which, at one
time or another, had been made the grounds for impeachment in England. He offers such an analysis, in the expectation that it will "serve,
broadly speaking, to delineate the outlines of 'high crimes and
misdemeanors,' " which, he continues, "are reducible to intelligible
categories." Among those he specifies are "misapplication of funds,"
"neglect of duty," "conversion of public property," "betrayal of trust"
and "giving pernicious advice to the crown." 5 6 But such an attempted
analysis neglects an essential point. Only under certain circumstances
does conversion of public property rise to the level of a "high" crime
or misdemeanor. Only in particular contexts, where particular results
follow, can the giving of pernicious advice be reckoned a punishable
offense at all. To define inductively the category "high crimes and
misdemeanors" requires one to search not for some common element
in the particular actions that have been censured, but for some
common element in the particular situations that gave to misdeeds of

53.

2 M. FARRAND, supra note 50, at 550; discussed in BERGER, at 86.

54. Berger puts the matter somewhat disingenuously: "Manifestly, this substitution
was made for the purpose of limiting, not expanding the initial Mason proposal."
BERGER, at 86 (emphasis added). The only vote actually taken resulted in expanding
the draft that was before the Convention. Moreover, Madison himself, on a later
occasion, used the word "mal-administration" to describe a class of impeachable offenses. In the First Congress, on June 17, 1789. he spoke as follows:
The danger . . . consists . . . in this: the President can displace from office a man

whose merits require that he should be continued in it. What will be the motives
which the President can feel for such abuse of his power, and the restraints that
operate to prevent it? In the first place, he will be impeachable by this House.
before the Senate, for such an act of mal-administration; for I contend that the
wanton removal of meritorious officers would subject him to impeachment and
removal from his own high trust.
I ANNALS OF CONG. 517 (1834).

55. If "high crimes and misdemeanors" had an ascertainable content at the time
the Constitution was adopted, that content furnishes the boundary of the power.
It is no more open to Congress [in impeachment proceedings] to stray beyond
these boundaries than it is to include in the companion word "bribery" an offense such as "robbery," which had a quite different common law connotation.
Id. at 87.
56. Id. at 69-71.
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exceedingly diverse kinds the ominous character of threats to the state
and its constitution. The crucial determinant is not the instrinsic nature of the action itself, but the context that elevated it to the level
designated "high." Because this is so, this reviewer cannot help agreeing with the opinion of Joseph Story (which Berger categorically rejects), that "political offenses are of so various and complex a character, so utterly incapable of being defined, or classified, that the task of
positive legislation would be impracticable, if it were not almost ab'
surd to attempt it."57
D.

Impeachment and Indictment: Must One Precede the Other?

The fourth of Berger's arguments takes us closest to what appears
to be his real, though largely unstated, feeling about impeachment as
a constitutional process-namely, that virtually all its purposes could
be carried out, and better carried out, by regular judicial proceedings
in the ordinary courts. With respect to the disciplining of errant judges
he has, in this reviewer's opinion, proved his point., The controlling
principle in this matter is the independence of the judiciary. Impeachment, though a quasi-judicial procedure, is at least equally a
quasi-political one, and as such has the potential of subjecting the judiciary to totally unacceptable political pressures. But political pressures applied to the political branches of government-or applied by
one branch to the other-are far from illegitimate; they constitute the
vital force of the political system itself.
Berger is perfectly right in arguing that whenever an issue is a
clearly justiciable one, it should be dealt with by regular courts, not by
impeachment proceedings. He cites the series of decisions on legislative apportionment, beginning with Baker v. Carr,58 as evidence that
the courts can successfully apply judicial methods to what have hitherto been labelled "political questions." 59 Prosecution for outright
criminal conduct, moreover, can hardly be supposed to raise "political
questions" merely because the accused holds political office. Impeachment was not designed to oust the courts of their normal jurisdiction

57. 2J. STORY, supra note 27, § 795, at 264; quoted (from a later edition with altered
numbering) in BERGER, at 77 n.126.

58.

369U.S. 186 (1962).

59.

BEROER, at 104-111L'
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over violations of the criminal law by whomsoever committed. To the
contrary, the Constitution specifically makes every public official,
from the President down, "liable and subject to Indictment, Trial,
Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. ' 60 Impeachment, in
other words, is in addition to, not in substitution for, regular forms of
trial. There is nothing whatever in the Constitution itself to support
the view that conviction and removal by impeachment must precede
criminal indictment and trial of public office-holders. 6 1 On general
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl.7. The antecedent clause specifically mentions the
President.
61. The relevant clause (art. I, § 3, cl.7) begins by specifying and limiting the penalties imposable by impeachment, and then, employing the phrase "but nevertheless" as a
transition, turns to the subject of criminal indictment. The word "nevertheless." which
obviously carries no implication of priority in timing, was used in every draft of the
clause that ever came before the Convention. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 50, at 173. 187.
438, 576, 592. Moreover, it was the word originally used in the archetypal provision of
the N.Y. CoNST. art. 33 (1777) reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSrTIUONS 2623,
2635 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909). Alexander Hamilton would have liked to make impeachment prerequisite to indictment in the case of the President, but he never offered such a
proposal in the Constitutional Convention itself. Instead he handed to Madison in the
closing days a paper which he said "delineated the Constitution which he would have
wished to be proposed by the Convention." 3 M. FARRAND, suipra note 50, at 619. Under its
terms the President would have been elected for life, id.at 624. and his essentially royal
character was indicated by the use of the word "abdicate" instead of "resign" to describe
a relinquishment of office by his own act, id. at 625. The immunity of a king from ordinary legal process would be bestowed upon this President-for-life. but unlike a king he
would be subject to impeachment. If convicted and removed he could (in Hamilton's
exact words) "be afterwards tried & punished in the ordinary course of law," id. (emphasis added). None of these features of Hamilton's plan received significant support in
the Convention. The next year, in THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (March 14. 1788), Hamilton
undertook to contrast the American presidency with the British monarchy, and in the
course of the comparison he remarked that the President, unlike the King, would be
liable to removal by impeachment "and would afterwards be liable to prosecution and
punishment in the ordinary course of law." THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 463 (J. Cooke
ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (emphasis added). Whether this represented a lapse of memory
on Hamilton's part or a deliberate attempt to substitute his own conception for that of
the Convention would be hard to determine. But a mere glance at the documents suffices to determine that the unauthorized interpolation of the word "afterwards" alters the
meaning of the Constitution. On this dubious foundation has been erected a doctrine
that has found its latest expression in the White House brief filed in U.S. District Court
on August 7, 1973, in connection with the Watergate tapes. The President, asserts
the brief, "is liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law for
crimes he has committed, but only after he has been impeached, convicted, and removed
from office." New York Times, Aug. 8, 1973, at 18, col. 7 (emphasis added). Three citations are given in support of this statement, to wit, art. I. § 3, of the Constitution
(which says nothing about "after"); Hamilton's just quoted misstatement in THE
v.
FEDERALIST and the following dictum of the Supreme Court in Kendall
United States: "The executive power is vested in a president; and so far as his powers
are derived from the constitution, he is beyond the reach of any other department, except in the mode prescribed by the constitution through the impeaching power." 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 524, 610 (1838). Elsewhere the White House brief also quotes Attorney General Henry Stanbery in what was only an argument of counsel before the Supreme
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Court and not an official opinion. So long as the President is in office, Stanbery argued,
he "is above the process of any court," except the "quasi court" that tries impeachments
(i.e., the Senate). "[A] fter he has been dealt with in that chamber and stripped of the
robes of office," continued Stanbery, so that "he no longer stands as the representative of
the government, then for any wrong he has done by any individual, for any murder or
any crime of any sort which he has committed as President, then and not till then can he
be subjected to the jurisdiction of the courts." Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
475, 484-85 (1867). Though the Court ruled for the President, it did so on rather different and far narrower grounds, explicitly refusing to decide whether the President
"may be held amenable, in any case, otherwise than by impeachment for crime."
Opinion of the Court (Chase, CJ.), id. at 498. Quite obviotisly the Court did not endorse
Stanbery's astounding contention that the President is immune to prosecution even for
murder so long as he can hang on to his office and escape removal by impeachment.
The contention that impeachment must precede indictment was put forward once
more during the legal maneuvers preceding the resignation of Vice President Spiro
T. Agnew on Oct. 10, 1973. On Sept. 25 the Vice President requested an inquiry by
the House of Representatives into charges that were being investigated by the U.S.
District Attorney in Baltimore, Agnew's contention being "that the Constitution bars
a crinimal proceeding of any kind-federal or state, county or town-against a President or Vice President while he holds office." Letter from Vice President Spiro T.
Agnew to Speaker of the House Carl Albert, Sept. 25, 1973, reprinted in Washington
Post, Sept. 26, 1973, at A-12. After denial of this request and commencement of the
presentation of evidence to the grand jury, Agnew's attorneys on Sept. 28 asked the
U.S. District Court for Maryland to halt the grand jury proceedings on the ground
that "[t] he Constitution forbids that the Vice President be indicted or tried in any
criminal court." Motion of Vice President Agnew, In re Proceedings of The Grand
Jury Impaneled Dec. 5, 1972: Application of Spiro T. Agnew, Vice President of the
United States, Civil No. 73-965 (D.C. Md. Sept. 28, 1973), reprinted in New York
Times, Sept. 29, 1973, at 12, cols. 4-6. An accompanying memorandum referred to
"the intentions of Alexander Hamilton, Gouverneur Morris and others in framing
the Constitution." Id. The U.S. Department of Justice opposed Agnew's motion, and
on Oct. 5 the Solicitor General, Robert H. Bork, filed with the court a Memorandum
for the United States Concerning the Vice President's Claim of Constitutional Immunity, which argued that only the President is immune to indictment and criminal
prosecution while in office. Memorandum for the United States Concerning the Vice
President's Claim of Constitutional Immunity, In re Proceedings of The Grand Jury
Impaneled Dec. 5, 1972: Application of Spiro T. Agnew, Vice President of the
United States, Civil No. 73-965 (D.C. Md. Oct. 5, 1973). The Memorandum makes
two extremely important concessions: (1) that "the only explicit immunity in the
Constitution is the limited immuhity granted Congressmen," and moreover that "the
natural inference is that no immunity exists where none is mentioned" (id. at 4-5);
and (2) that the clause of the Constitution which "provides that the 'Party convicted'
is nonetheless subject to criminal punishment" [i.e., art. I, § 3, cl. 7] was intended
"not to establish the sequence of the two processes, but solely to establish that conviction upon impeachment does not raise a double jeopardy defense in a criminal
trial" (d. at 10). On the basis of this reading of the Constitution, the Memorandum
unhesitatingly asserts that "it is clear that the Framers and their contemporaries understood that lesser impeachable officers [i.e., all except the President] are subject to
criminal process" (id. at 7).
To establish an exception for the President is the formidable problem that the
Memorandum tackles next. No appeal to the written Constitution is possible, for that
document's provisions respecting impeachment make no distinction whatever among
officers, save to provide that "[w] hen the President of the United States is tried, the
Chief Justice shall preside" (art. I, § 3, cl. 6). Citation of the Constitution being foreclosed, the Memorandum simply alleges that the debates in the Federal Convention
"strongly suggest an understanding that the President, as Chief Executive, would not
be subject to the ordinary criminal process" (Memorandum, supra, at 6). In support
of this purportedly historical assertion, the Memorandum offers only five fragments
of contemporaneous historical evidence, to wit: (1) Hamilton's statement in THE
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principles the exact reverse would appear to be the more desirable
order of proceeding. An official accused of an indictable crime ought
first to be tried for it, surrounded by all the safeguards of courtroom
due process. If convicted he should have the option of resigning (if he
has not already done so) or of facing an impeachment trial to determine the essentially political question whether his offense was of so
"high" a character that the public interest would be injured and respect for law undermined were he permitted to continue in office. Any
interpretation of the Constitution that would rule out such an orderly
procedure is not only totally unwarranted by the document itself but
would be pernicious in tendency, for it would stand in the way of extending judicial proceedings and judicial safeguards-as Berger
rightly wishes them extended-over as many controversies involving
official conduct or the extent of governmental powers as can possibly
be made to assume the form of justiciable cases.
E.

Does Every Violation of the ConstitutionGive Rise to a
Justiciable Case?

Is it possible, however, for all vital constitutional controversies to
be cast into the form of cases and controversies that courts can adjudicate? Though Berger stops short of maintaining that all of them can
-he would retain impeachment as "a last resort"6 2-he believes so
strongly in the possibility of referring even the most difficult issues to
judicial solution, that one must inject a sharp reminder. "Courts," said

FEDERALIST No. 69, the unreliability of which is discussed supra; (2) an incidental
statement by the same writer in THE FEDERALIST No. 65, which simply assumes that
impeachment would normally precede criminal prosecution; (3) a statement based
on the same incidental assumption, made by Gouverneur Morris on Sept. 4, 1787, in
the Convention, as follows: "A conclusive reason for making the Senate instead of
the Supreme Court the Judge of impeachments, was that the latter was to try the
President after the trial of the impeachment" (2 M. FARRAND, supra note 50, at 500):
(4) an equally incidental statement by James Wilson in the same place on Sept. 15.
1787: "Pardon is necessary for cases of treason, and is best placed in the hands of
the Executive. If he be himself a party to the guilt he can be impeached and prosecuted" (id. at 626); and (5) a debate in the Convention on July 20, 1787 (d. at
64-69). in which the question of making the President impeachable while in office was
discussed pro and con (and finally decided in favor of impeachability), but in which
no mention whatever was made of his possible liability to or immunity from ordinary
criminal prosecution. Rarely if ever has an important constitutional doctrine been
supported by such flimsy historical evidence.
62. BERGER, at 299 (emphasis in the original).
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Mr. Justice Stone, "are not the only agency of government that must
be assumed to have capacity to govern," and he uttered a warning
against "any assumption that the responsibility for the preservation of
our institutions is the exclusive concern of any one of the three
branches of government, or that it alone can save them from destruction. '63 If we forget the inherent limitations of judicial review and
cherish the dangerous illusion that all crucial constitutional issues are
ultimately resolvable in the courtroom, then some of the most important elements in the constitutional system are left unguarded.
The Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the
land in a political and not merely a juridical sense. Where individual
rights are infringed by unconstitutional exercises of power, the courts
have a handle by which they can take hold of the constitutional issue
involved and decide it. This means, however, that there must be found
some party with standing to sue, who can show that his individual
rights are adversely affected. The history of judicial review is in part a
record of the ability of the bar to devise cases that will satisfy the criteria of justiciability and the willingness of the bench to concede a
standing to parties whose direct personal loss or gain is minimal in
amount. Nevertheless, the possibility of putting a constitutional issue
into a form suitable for adjudication depends a great deal on what
kind of constitutional issue it is.
Where clearly defined restrictions have been placed upon the exercise of governmental powers, as in the Bill of Rights, judicial enforcement can perhaps be relied on, in theory at least, as all-sufficient. A
second class of problems arises from the constitutional division of
powers between the Federal government and the States. In these problems economic interests are so frequently affected by legislative measures that it has rarely been difficult to find litigants and to devise cases
to test the constitutionality of either federal or state enactments"
whether by balancing the commerce clause against the tenth amendment or otherwise. The judiciary has therefore proved effective as an
arbiter of federal-state relationships, though the Dred Scott decision
and the Child Labor case of 191864 (among others) may raise doubts
about the wisdom (or indeed the feasibility) of attempting to de-fuse
63.
64.

United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 87-88 (1936) (dissenting opinion).
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); Hammer v. Dagenhart,

247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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deep-seated and potentially explosive controversies about the locus of
political power by placing the ultimate decision in judicial hands.
There is a third class of constitutional issues that must be reckoned
with-namely, conflicts between the executive and legislative
branches. The allocations of power to the President and to Congress
respectively are, equally with all other provisions of the Constitution,
parts of the supreme law of the land. Berger sees no difficulty in turning over to the courts the enforcement of these political parts of the
supreme law. A "controversy between Congress and the President,
arising out of conflicting claims to power" becomes, in his tranquilizing description, merely "a boundary dispute," and he insists that
"l[c] onflicting boundary claims are preeminently suited to judicial
arbitrament, the least disruptive of solutions. '6 5 Judicial review, however, operates in an almost completely one-sided way in situations like
this. If Congress attempts to usurp the powers of the President, and if
his veto is overridden, the legislation that results is almost certain to
affect individual rights and therefore to be reachable by the normal
processes of judicial review. By contrast, if the President attempts to
usurp the powers of Congress, the latter possesses neither the equivalent of the veto nor the power to bring suit in the courts in its own
name to defend its authority, as (for example) a state is able to do in
many circumstances.
An executive act, moreover, differs in very important respects from
a legislatively enacted statute. The latter produces its intended effect
by operating continuously over an indefinite period of time. Accordingly, it can be judicially examined at leisure, and if found unconstitutional its operation can be cut short and its previous effects largely
nullified. With such an effective remedy available, it would be absurd
to think of prosecuting the individual legislators who voted the unconstitutional statute. Quite different, however, is the operation of an
executive order. Its purpose is to put something into effect, more or
less immediately. The phrase "acting with dispatch" is a recurrent one
in descriptions of the function of the Executive, and an executive
action once initiated can rarely be halted in mid-course. Moreover, to
say that an order has been executed or a measure carried into effect
means, in general, that something has been accomplished beyond re-

65.
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call. The community is presented with a fait' accompli. Hence the
safeguards and remedies available against an unconstitutional statute
are largely unavailable against an unconstitutional act of executive
power. What has been done cannot be undone, and those injured have
little chance of effective recompense. The only things that can be done
-and the things that must be done if the abuse of power is not to
become a precedent for subsequent and perhaps even graver abuses
and usurpations-is to render the perpetrat6r incapable of further
wrongdoing and to make his punishment serve as a warning to his
successors. Impeachment serves the latter purpose fully as much as the
former, by sentencing the offender, in Hamilton's words, "to a perpetual ostracism from the esteem and confidence, and honors and emoluments of his country. '66
F.

Impeachment After Leaving Office

The striking down of dangerous precedents being one object of
impeachment, it is immaterial whether charges are voted while the
official remains in office (when he is liable both to removal and disqualification) or after he quits it (when the only available penalty is
perpetual disqualification). From the tenor of current discussions it
would appear that many members of Congress, to say nothing of the
general public, assume that the liability of an official to impeachment
somehow terminates the instant he leaves office, whether through expiration of his term or through resignation. Such an assumption has
no substantial historical foundation and is not supported by a single
authoritative and unequivocal decision of recent times.
To begin with, the English precedents negative the idea that officials were subject to impeachment only so long as they held office.
Conspicuously present in the minds of the framers of the American
Constitution was the contemporaneous impeachment trial of Warren
Hastings, who had resigned the governor-generalship of India before
sailing for home in February, 1785, more than two years before articles of impeachment for his conduct in India were voted by the House
of Commons in April, 1787.67

66. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 442 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
67. H. Keene, Warren Hastings,in 9 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 136, 144-45
(1908).
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In the second place, American constitutional documents adopted
prior to the Federal Convention of 1787 likewise refute the notion
that officials no longer in office were supposed by the framers to be
beyond the reach of impeachment. Two of the state constitutions
adopted in 1776-those of Virginia and Delaware-took account of
the disturbing effect that an attempt to remove the highest officer of
government might have and therefore provided that the Governor (or
President) could be impeached only "when he is out of office,"
whereas other officials were made subject to impeachment at any
68
time.
Turning to the Constitution of the United States one finds no provision setting a time limit for the initiation of impeachment proceedings.
Any statute of limitations is, as its name implies, a positive statutory
limitation, in the absence of which the common law maxim prevails,
that a legal right never dies. 6 9 Recognizing this, the already-mentioned
constitution of Delaware had fixed a definite period of 18 months during which impeachment proceedings had to be commenced-18
months after the offense committed in the case of subordinate officers
(who could be impeached at any time); and 18 months after the end
of his term in the case of the governor (who, as has been noted, was
immune while in office).7 0 By ordinary rules of construction, the absence
of a comparable provision in the federal Constitution meant not that
action was barred after the end of an official's term, but that the power
to impeach remained alive indefinitely.
On the only occasion when the timing of impeachment was discussed in the Constitutional Convention of 1787, most members took
68.

The Governor, when he is out of office, and others, offending against the

State, either by mal-administration, corruption, or other means, by which the safety
of the State may be endangered, shall be impeachable by the House of Delegates.
VA. CONST. (1776) reprinted in 7 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3812, 3818 (F.

Thorpe ed. 1909).
The president, when he is out of office, and within eighteen months after, and all
others . . . within eighteen months after the offence committed, shall be impeachable by the house of assembly before the legislative council.
DEL. CONST. art. 23 (1776) reprinted in I FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at

562-66.
In 1844 New Jersey replaced its old constitution of 1776 (which had no specific impeachment provision) with a new one which provided: "The governor and all other civil
officers . . . shall be liable to impeachment . . . during their continuance in office.

and for two years thereafter." N.J. CONST. art. v, § 11 (1844) reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2599, 2607.
69. 2 J. BOUVIER, LAW DICTIONARY 50 (1 1th ed. 1866).
70. See note 68 supra.
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it for granted that the President would be impeachable after he left
office. The only question at issue was whether he should also be impeachable while in office. The Convention, by a vote of eight states to
two, made him so, without giving the slightest indication that this ac71
tion constituted any grant of immunity to him after his term ended.
In The Federalist No. 39, Madison specifically compared the impeachment provisions of Virginia and Delaware with those in the new
federal Constitution, stressing that the latter extended, not curtailed
the liability of the Chief Executive by denying him immunity "during
his continuance in office."172 In 1846, long after he left the White
House, John Quincy Adams declared on the floor of Congress: "I hold
myself, so long as I have the breath of life in my body, amenable to
impeachment by this House for everything I did during the time I held
73
any public office."1
To be sure, an argument could be (and was) constructed by taking
as a premise the obvious fact that the primary penalty in impeachments is removal from office, and by proceeding to the conclusion
(somewhat reminiscent of the debate in Alice in Wonderland about
beheading the Cheshire Cat74) that a person must be in office in order
to be removed from it. What was difficult to explain away was the fact
that removal was only one of two impeachment penalties. And the
other-disqualification-seemed to J.Q. Adams "a more severe punishment than mere removal" because "[i] t clings to a man as long as
75
he lives."
The argument that a person out of office could not be impeached
for high crimes and misdemeanors committed while in office was one
of several contentions put forward in 1797-99 by the defense in the
case of Senator William Blount, who had been expelled before im-

71.

Debate of July 20, 1787, reprinted in 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 50, at 64-69.

72. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 252-53 (J.Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison). In the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention, James Wilson (who assumed that Senators would be
impeachable) remarked: "When a member of the Senate shall behave criminally, the
criminality will not expire with his office. The Senators may be called to account after
they shall have been charged." 2 J.

ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 477 (2d ed. 1836).

73. Speech of April 9, 1846. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., Ist Sess. 641 (1846).
74. "The executioner's argument was, that you couldn't cut off a head unless there
was a body to cut it off from . . . .The King's argument was that anything that had a
head could be beheaded." C. DODGSON [L. CARROLL], ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN
WONDERLAND 69 (D. Gray ed. 1971).
75. See note 73 supra.
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peachment proceedings began. The Senate decided not to proceed,
but for a different reason.76 Accordingly Joseph Story, commenting a
third of a century later, declined to express any opinion on the question of the impeachability of an official after leaving office on the
' 77
ground that it was a matter "still subjudice.
The question came up again in unambiguous form in 1876, when
evidence was uncovered of malfeasance by William W. Belknap, Secretary of War in Grant's cabinet. Belknap hastily resigned at 10:20
A.M. on the 2nd of March, a few hours before the House of Representatives voted to impeach him, the latter decision being officially
notified to the Senate at 12:55 P.M. on the 3rd.7 8 Belknap denied the
jurisdiction of the Senate on the ground that at the time the impeachment was voted he "was, [and] ever since hath been, and now is, a
private citizen." 79 On May 27, 1876, by a roll-call vote of 37 to 29
(with seven not voting) the Senate ruled that Belknap was "amenable
to trial by impeachment for acts done as Secretary of War, notwithstanding his resignation of said office before he was impeached." 80 By
a second vote of 35 to 22 (with 16 not voting) it instructed the President of the Senate to pronounce formal judgment that Belknap's plea
to the jurisdiction was "overruled and held for naught."8 1 At the end
of the trial, however, 25 Senators voted for acquittal, of whom 22 did
so on the ground that the resignation barred impeachment. Though
37 senators voted guilty, a two-thirds majority (which would have
numbered 42) was required, and hence Belknap finally won acquittal. 82 It is possible to find ambiguity here, but hardly confirmation of
the argument that by leaving office a public official can escape responsibility for the high crimes and misdemeanors he may have committed
while in office.
Berger has elected not to discuss this question of the impeachability
of an official once he has ceased to hold office, and his index makes
76.
77.

2J. STORY, supra note 27, §§ 791, 800-03, at 259-60, 270-73.
Id. § 803, at 273.

78.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE SITTING FOR THE TRIAL OF WILLIAM W. BELKNAP,
LATE SECRETARY OF WAR. ON THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT EXHIBITED BY THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, 44th Cong., Ist Sess. 7, 760-61 (1876).
79.
Id. at 23.

80.

Id.at239.

81.
Id. at 241.
82. Id. at 1165-66. On all five articles the same 25 Senators voted "not guilty;- the
vote for conviction fluctuated from 35 to 37. For the statements of individual Senators

explaining their votes, see id. at 1049-1122.
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no mention of the Belknap case. To this reviewer, however, the matter
seems to have greater theoretical significance and wider practical contemporary relevance than such a question as the impeachability of an
official for misconduct prior to his appointment or outside his official
83
duties-a matter to which Berger devotes an entire chapter.
The greatest constitutional issue of the present day is the extent of
presidential power-whether what is claimed is a power to carry out
long-continued bombing operations in Cambodia both without a declaration of war and in secret, a power to halt congressionally authorized programs by impounding funds or an executive privilege
against furnishing tape recordings to a grand jury. If unconstitutional
usurpations of power, destructive of the balances of the Constitution,
have occurred, then impeachment is, as Joseph Story observed, the
appropriate "check upon arbitrary power," designed to assure "a deep
and immediate responsibility" by compelling "the chief magistrate, as
well as the humblest citizen, to bend to the majesty of the laws. '84 The
removal of the actual head of state, however, is potentially so threatening to the stability of government itself, that public opinion is
usually prepared to allow precedents of executive usurpation to accumulate rather than to run the risks involved in impeachment. Such
risks, however, disappear if a President is made to answer for willful
violations of the supreme law after he has ceased to be in office. This,
perhaps, is the least disruptive way in which constitutional precedents
of fatal tendency can be decisively repudiated and reversed.
G.

Executive Accountability Through Impeachment

Only by holding the Chief Executive to strict accountability for his
acts and for the acts carried out under his authority can unconstitutional exercises of power be prevented from accumulating as precedents. The personal and undivided responsibility that an Executive
assumes is quite different from the diffused responsibility of the members of a deliberative assembly, whose acts of legislation are directly
reviewable by the courts. Accordingly one principal argument for a
single Chief Executive as against a plural Executive or Directory has

83.

84.

ch. VI, at 193-213.
2 J. STORY, supra note 27, § 811, at 279.
BERGER,
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always been the necessity of fixing unambiguously this direct and personal responsibility.
Hamilton, who argued in The Federalistfor a single vigorous Executive on precisely these grounds, made it clear that to hold an Executive responsible implied a power to discipline him for such misuses of
authority as were by their nature irremediable or irreversible. "Responsibility," he wrote, "is of two kinds, to censure and to punishment." The chief danger in the diffusion of executive power, Hamilton
85
continued:
[is its tendency] to deprive the people of the two greatest securities
they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power: first,
the restraints of public opinion, . . . and secondly, the opportunity of
discovering with facility and clearness the misconduct of the persons
they trust, in order either to [bring about] their removal from office or
to [bring about] their actual punishment, in cases which admit of it.
The punishment in question, as Hamilton's words make clear, is
punishment for the irresponsible use of power. Now irresponsibility in
the use of power signifies something other than the attempted exercise
of powers not constitutionally granted and something other than the
use of power in violation of constitutional restrictions. Judicial review
is. quite capable of handling these two abuses. But if a power is clearly
granted, and if in its use no constitutional prohibitions are transgressed, then the courts can proceed no further, for it is not a judicial
function to decide whether the discretion legally vested in a legislative
body or an executive official has been used to the detriment of the
commonwealth. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated well this
limit of judicial authority when in 1843 it refused to declare a
measure unconstitutional simply because "it violates the spirit of our
institutions." In his opinion for the court, Chief Justice Jeremiah S.
86
Black (later Attorney General of the United States) remarked:
The wisdom of man has never conceived of a government with power
sufficient to answer its legitimate ends, and at the same time incapable
of mischief. No political system can be made so perfect that its rulers
will always hold it to the true course. In the very best a great deal must
be trusted to the discretion of those who administer it.
85.

THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 476-78 (J. Cooke ed. 196 1) (A. Hamilton).

86.

Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 (1853); excerpted in W. DODD,

CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 31, 33 (4th ed. 1950).
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But, he continued, "There is no shadow of reason for supposing that
the mere abuse of power was meant to be corrected by the judiciary."
Instead there must be "direct accountability" to the people. Accountability for the irresponsible abuse of discretionary power, to put the
matter in other words, must be enforced by political not by judicial

means.
Impeachment "by the most solemn grand inquest" of the nation for
such misuses of discretionary power as subvert the fundamental prin-

ciples of government-in other words, for "high" crimes and
misdemeanors-is one of the ultimate sanctions of the American constitutional system. It is a quasi-judicial sanction, because it implies
something more than a vote of no confidence; it involves trial and

conviction for violation of the supreme law of the land. But it is also,
of necessity, a quasi-political sanction, because the outcome represents
a political judgment-a judgment that certain acts, though within the
scope of an official's delegated powers, subvert the political principles
on which the government itself is based.
III

CONCLUSION

Impeachment was one of the three basic checks written into the
Constitution of the United States. Each check placed in a particular
branch the power to resist usurpations of power that might threaten
the balance on which the constitutional system depended.8 7, These
87. The doctrine of separation of powers, a corollary of the principle that it is essential for the Constitution to maintain a balance of powers if tyranny is to be prevented
and freedom secured, is so often invoked today as if it were designed to prohibit one
branch of government from inquiring into the operations of another, that a reminder of
its original meaning is in order. In the minds of the framers the separation of powers
was intended above all to prohibit the usurpation by one branch of the powers delegated
to another. In proposing to Congress on June 8, 1789, what would ultimately become the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution, James Madison adapted from the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 a statement defining the principle of separation of
powers. Madison's version, though ultimately dropped from the Bill of Rights as that
document was gradually rephrased and condensed, nevertheless can be taken as a consensus of the framers' views as to the meaning of separation of powers:
The powers delegated by this Constitution are appropriated to the departments
to which they are respectively distributed: so that the Legislative Department shall
never exercise the powers vested in the Executive or Judicial, nor the Executive
exercise the powers vested in the Legislative or Judicial, nor the Judicial exercise
the powers vested in the Legislative or Executive Departments.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 448, 453 (1834), reprinted in E. DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS
AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 206, 209 (1957). The provision remained in the Bill of
Rights as passed by the House on August 24, 1789, but disappeared when the Senate
reduced the number of articles from 17 to 12. E. DummAULD, supra, at 212, 216, 219.
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three devices had some basis in English tradition, but all three had
become obsolete or were obsolescent there. Judicial review, the check
placed in judicial hands, had really never been more than a gleam in
the eye of English constitutional thinkers-hence the constant reiteration, in all discussions of the matter, of a single isolated quotation;
namely, Sir Edward Coke's famous dictum of 1610 in Dr. Bonham's
Case.8 8 Veto, the check placed in the President's hands, had last been
exercised in England by Queen Anne in 1707.89
Impeachment, the check placed in the hands of Congress, was actually the one procedure that was still alive in Britain. As the proposed
Constitution went before the ratifying conventions of the several
American states in 1788, the most spectacular impeachment trial of
the age got under way in the House of Lords. This was the trial of
Warren Hastings, the first Governor-General of British India, charged
with abuses of power there. Though Hastings was finally acquitted in
1795, and though historians will probably always differ when they
come to balance his high handed and arbitrary conduct against the
reforms he admittedly carried out in the corrupt administrative system
of the British East India Company, the fact that he was brought to
trial at all represented, in a way, the first awakening of a national conscience with respect to the exploitation of distant peoples and a first
attempt to enforce responsibility upon imperial officials for actions
taken far beyond the reach of the ordinary courts and laws of the
realm.
Be that as it may, the role that impeachment played in 18th century
conceptions of constitutionalism was stated with accuracy and eloquence in the opening statement for the prosecution in the trial of
Hastings. The speaker was Edmund Burke, already revered across the
Atlantic for his speech on conciliation with America. It is therefore
proper to assume that he was expressing what the framers of the
American Constitution also believed to be the role of impeachment in
maintaining a free and responsible government.
88. And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will controul
acts of parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an
act of parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible
to be performed, the common law will controul it and adjudge such act to be void.
Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Coke, Rep. 118 (1610), quoted and discussed in E. CORWIN, THE
"HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 44 (1955), as well as in
almost every book ever written on judicial review.
89.
1 W. ANSON, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE CONSTITUTION 301 (3d ed. 1897).
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At the very outset Burke insisted that "the interests of our constitution itself" required the preservation of impeachment, despite temporary periods of disuse, as an indispensable "resource." He continued: 9 0
It is by this process, that magistracy which tries and controls all other
things, is itself tried and controlled. Other constitutions are satisfied
with making good subjects; this is a security for good governors. It is
by this tribunal, that statesmen, who abuse their power, are accused by
statesmen, and tried by statesmen, not upon the niceties of a narrow
jurisprudence, but upon the enlarged and solid principles of state morality. It is here, that those, who by the abuse of power have violated
the spirit of law, can never hope for protection from any of its forms:
-it is here, that those, who have refused to conform themselves to its
perfections, can never hope to escape through any of its defects. It
ought, therefore, my lords, to become our common care to guard this
your precious deposit, rare in its use, but powerful in its effect, with a
religious vigilance, and never to suffer it to be either discredited or
antiquated.
This was not the advice of a heedless revolutionary, ready to upset
established institutions and authorities for light and transient causes.
It was the advice of the most profound of the conservative thinkers of
18th century Britain, committed to the view that political society is no
mere contract "to be taken up for a little temporary interest," but "a
partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in
every virtue, and in all perfection." 9 ' The power to impeach a faithless minister was not, to Burke, a power dangerous to order and to
justice. On the contrary, it was the "great guardian of the purity of the
'92
constitution.
Professor Berger's searching inquiry should challenge us to think
once more about the nature of that guardianship and the difficulties
involved in making it effective.

90.

7 E.

BURKE, WORKS 11, 13-14(1839).
E. BURKE, Reflections on the Revolution in France(1790), in 3 E. BURKE, WORKS,
at 19, 120.
92. E. BURKE, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents (1770), in I E.

91.

BURKE, WORKS, at 347, 397, quoted in BERGER, at 299 n.3.
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